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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1272 
___________ 
 
JASON KOKINDA, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KOCH INDUSTRIES INC, official capacity; TOM WOLF, personal capacity; 
WILLIAM R. STOYCOS, personal capacity; KATHLEEN KANE, personal capacity; 
TOM CORBETT, personal capacity; JACK MARKELL, personal capacity; 
HARRINGTON POLICE DEPT., official/personal capacity; DOVER POLICE DEPT., 
official/private capacity; JOHN DOE #1, Personal capacity; JOHN DOE #2, personal 
capacity; JOHN DOE #3, personal capacity; NEWARK POLICE DEPT., official/private 
capacity 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-17-cv-01531) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 19, 2018 
 
Before:  JORDAN, SHWARTZ and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  June 7, 2018)
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_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jason Kokinda appeals pro se from the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  Because we conclude that this appeal lacks 
arguable merit, we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 
 Kokinda filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983, 
accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis, in the United States District 
Court for the District of Delaware.  Kokinda’s claims are difficult to decipher, but appear 
to include claims of retaliation, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and harassment.  His 
complaint includes allegations that he is a “political trophy” of the former Pennsylvania 
governor; that the former and current governor have conspired to retaliate against him 
through ongoing subliminal threats and physical harassment, including engaging him in a 
high speed car chase, stalking him, and instructing “junkie prostitute[s]” to “castrate 
him.” 1  The District Court granted Kokinda leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and later 
sua sponte dismissed his complaint as frivolous, under the screening provision of § 
                                                            
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Other allegations include that defendants have conspired to keep him in prison 
permanently; he has a “tortured history of civil rights abuses by corrupt Pennsylvania 
officials;” he has been mislabeled as a sex offender in retaliation for his conduct; deputies 
have threatened to maliciously prosecute him; officers have conspired to fabricate a case 
against him; and he is the target of a “well-funded Masonic RICO conspiracy.”  Dkt # 1, 
at 2–7.   
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1915(e)(2)(B).  The Court held that the facts contained in Kokinda’s complaint did not 
rise to any constitutional violation, that there was no legal basis for his claims, and that 
Kokinda failed to show personal involvement of the defendants.  Kokinda filed a motion 
for reconsideration, which was denied by the District Court.  Kokinda appeals.  
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review of 
the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B).  See Allah v. Seiverling, 
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  “[W]e accept all factual allegations as true [and] 
construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. 
Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 
F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).  We review the denial of his motion for 
reconsideration for abuse of discretion.  Long v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 670 F.3d 
436, 446–47 (3d Cir. 2012).2   
 We agree with the District Court that Kokinda’s allegations are largely delusional 
and conclude that his complaint was properly dismissed as frivolous.  As discussed by the 
District Court, Kokinda’s allegations do not rise to any constitutional violation and his 
claims lack any legal basis.  See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).  
Moreover, Kokinda has failed to plead facts that, if proven, would show personal 
involvement by the defendants.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 
                                                            
2 The scope of this appeal is limited to the District Court’s December 28, 2017 order 
dismissing the complaint and the District Court’s January 30, 2018 order denying 
Kokinda’s motion for reconsideration.  Kokinda’s subsequent motion for reconsideration 
is not within the scope of this appeal, since Kokinda has not filed an amended notice of 
appeal. 
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1988) (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the 
alleged wrongs.”).  We agree with the District Court that, though Kokinda “infers” 
involvement by the defendants, he has failed to provide any factual support for his 
allegations.   
 In light of the nature of his factual allegations, we further find no error with the 
District Court’s determination that allowing Kokinda to amend his complaint would have 
been futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“[A]mendment must be permitted . . . unless it would be inequitable or futile.”).  Finally, 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kokinda’s motion for 
reconsideration, as the motion did not identify any of the grounds required for 
consideration.  See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
 Because we conclude that this appeal is legally frivolous, we will dismiss it 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 
